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COMMENTARIES 
Law Schools, Lawyers, and Tightly Closed Circles 
Robert B. McKay* 
Lawyers are central to the decisionmaking process in the 
United States. That is entirely understandable in connection 
with the resolution of the vast array of disputes, civil and crimi- 
nal, that either end up in court or have the potential for adjudica- 
tion. American adherence to the adversary system makes lawyers 
necessary to advise all parties to all disputes, actual and poten- 
tial. There are strikingly few alternatives to the adjudication 
model. Even arbitration, mediation, and conciliation processes, 
useful as they are, are largely administered by lawyers. The 
uniquely American rush to the courts has carried with it, how- 
ever, not only matters that are traditionally "judicial," but gen- 
eral problems of society, large and small, as well. 
The fact is that lawyers play a significant, often a dominant, 
role in making public policy on the great social issues of the day, 
from school desegregation to the siting of nuclear energy plants. 
Despite repeated complaints that the dispute-resolution process 
has been overjudicialized and that lawyers wield disproportionate 
control over the levers of power, there is little indication of a 
slackening of the litigation pace or a retreat of lawyers from the 
centers of power. 
Unquestionably, the United States is the most law-minded 
nation in the world. Whether that is good or bad is not the point 
here. The reality is that the nearly half a million lawyers in the 
United States play the dominant role in deciding disputes be- 
tween private individuals and are extremely influential in shap- 
ing public social policy. 
* Director, Program on Justice, Society, and the Individual, Aspen Institute for 
Humanistic Studies; former Dean, New York University School of Law, 1967-75. 
1. Interestingly enough, the principal effort to find nonlawyer alternatives for dispute 
resolution comes from the largest lawyer organization in the world, the American Bar 
Association (ABA). The ABA was one of the sponsors of the 1976 Pound Conference on 
the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice. It has subse- 
quentlv supported experiments in the use of less formal methods of dispute resolution, 
such as Neighborhood Justice Centers, and has established a Special Committee on the 
Resolution of Minor Disputes. 
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The importance of the lawyer's role is further emphasized by 
the fact that lawyers have a self-conferred monopoly over all legal 
issues. Only lawyers can represent others in court; only lawyers 
can give legal advice; only lawyers can authenticate legal docu- 
ments. 
If that is true at  the output side of the law, it is also strikingly 
true a t  the input side, that is, legal education. I t  is almost impos- 
sible to become a lawyer in the United States without attending 
a law school for a t  least three years of relatively formal study. 
Standards for admission to practice are fixed by lawyers; bar 
examinations are written and graded by lawyers; discipline and 
disbarment standards and procedures are principally controlled 
by lawyers. 
If the circle does not yet seem tightly enough closed, consider 
one final fact. The law schools, as gatekeepers of the profession, 
establish their own criteria for admission to the study of law. In 
a period when demand for legal education is high-which has 
been the case since the mid-Sixties-there is no such thing as an 
"open-admissions" law school. Since law professors generally are, 
or consider themselves to be, part of the intellectual elite, they 
seek students in the same mold-high achievers in primary and 
secondary schools, in college, and on the Law School Admissions 
Test (LSAT). To be sure, some less-than-superb applicants 
slip in because they are sons or daughters of favored alumni, 
legislators, or donors to the University. Moreover, in the last 
decade preference has sometimes been given to minority appli- 
cants to enlarge their representation in law  school^.^ In general, 
however, the preparation of lawyers is a meritocracy that begins 
before college and progresses in a straight line through admis- 
sion to law school, proficiently testing in law school, bar exami- 
nation, and admission to the bar. The skills emphasized and 
tested remain essentially the same from the LSAT through law 
school and the bar examination. It is now understood that the 
high achievers on the LSAT are the ones most likely to excel in 
law school and to perform well on the bar examination. Whether 
they will also be the "best" lawyers, whatever the criteria for 
2. But the special admissions program (known to its foes as reverse discrimination) 
has been challenged in public institutions as a violation of the equal protection of the laws 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 
Cal. :Id 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U . S .  1090 (1977). 
If special admissions programs are held invalid, the elitism of legal education will be 
further emphasized as the number of minority students declines further. 
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that judgment, is less clear. But that matter is being studied," 
and we should not be surprised if it turns out that the LSAT is a 
pretty good prophet at least as to financial success at the bar. 
Given this set of circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that 
lawyers in the aggregate-the legal profession, as we like to be 
called-have been relatively self-satisfied, even arrogant about 
their rights and prerogatives, until the last few years. Now, how- 
ever, no less an authority than the Supreme Court (how could 
fellow lawyers be so unfriendly?) has told lawyers that they may 
be members of a profession, but it is not so "learned" a profession 
as to be exempt from the antitrust laws.' Moreover, the profession 
cannot continue its long-cherished practice of self-regulation in- 
sensitive to such constitutional commands as the first amend- 
ment.5 In short, lawyers who wish to inform the public about legal 
services they offer (beyond the business card or discreet listing in 
the Yellow Pages and approved law directories) must be allowed 
to do so. There is a right to speak and a right to listen. 
The organized bar may be shaken, but legal education moves 
on regally, apparently impervious to change. Perhaps that is as 
it should be. For the fact is that legal education in the United 
States today is very good indeed. No other nation approaches the 
quality, indeed the luxury of the legal education apparatus in the 
United States. Teachers, students, libraries, and physical plants 
are excellent, often superb, and the level of intellectual excite- 
ment is very high. No one should question the attainments, which 
are of the very highest order. On the other hand, it is equally 
unwarranted for legal educators to sit back on their Blackstones 
in real or feigned unawareness that, as the world changes, so 
perhaps should legal education. 
And so I come at last to the excellent Gee-Jackson study. 
Their commendable purpose is to attempt "a critical examina- 
tion of American legal education." In the process they "raise 
some current issues and review certain historical antecedents as 
they illuminate those issues." And they further "seek to evaluate 
the processes and prospects for stability or change in American 
legal education. "6 
3. The Competent Lawyer Study, initiated in 1973, is jointly sponsored by Educa- 
tional Testing Service, the American Bar Foundation, the Law School Admission Council, 
and the National Conference of Bar Examiners. 
4. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
5. See Rates v. Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Counsel, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 
809 (1975). 
6. Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 
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Good. High time. But can they pull it off? My answer is a 
resounding affirmative, despite initial doubt that they could suc- 
ceed in so ambitious an undertaking in only about 300 pages. My 
original skepticism was not based on lack of faith in the ability 
of these two young authors. Their capacity has been amply dem- 
onstrated in their two 1975 monographs, Following the  Leader?: 
T h e  Unexamined Consensus in Law School Curricula7 and Bread 
and Butter?: Electives in American Legal Education. Both stud- 
ies provide useful confirmation of points long suspected: that law 
schools are essentially imitative in their curricular choices, and 
that students choose electives on the basis of real or imagined 
advantage in preparation for the bar or in having a record that 
will look good to a prospective employer. But neither of the earlier 
studies attempted any major probing of legal education in its 
entirety. 
In fact, there have been only a few efforts to look at  legal 
education as a whole. Perhaps the best, by A.Z. Reed in 1921,g is 
not widely read today. Probably it never was; some of its recom- 
mendations are still untried, but continue to be suggested anew 
as if in reinvention of the legal education wheel. The most ambi- 
tious survey of legal education was compiled for the Association 
of American Law Schools (AALS) under the supervision of an 
able law school dean."' But the substance behind the mass of not- 
very-illuminating data was disappointing, and the volume was 
not particularly influential. 
More recent studies of legal education have been useful, and 
each has made specific suggestions for modification and improve- 
ment of legal education,ll principally in ways to shorten and in- 
tensify the law school experience. But it is scarcely too strong to 
say that most of those recommendations have sunk without a 
trace into the placid pool of law school self-satisfaction. Even the 
most careful evaluation of legal education is not likely to survive 
as standard reading matter if its proposals for change are not 
1977 R.Y.U.L. REV. 695, 698. 
7. E. GEE & D. JACKSON, FOLLOWING THE LEADER?: THE UNEXAMINED CONSENSUS IN 
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA (1975). 
8. D. JACKSON & E. GEE, BREAD AND B ~ E R ? :  ELECTIVES w AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCA- 
TION (1975), reviewed in Kelso, Book Review, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 597. 
9. A. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION F THE LAW (1921) (Carnegie Foun- 
dation for the Advancement of Teaching Bull. No. 15). 
10. A. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1953). 
11. See, e.g.,  H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS I  LEGAL EDUCATION (1972); 
CURRICULUM STUDY PROJECT COMMITTEE, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSIONS OF THE 
LAW: 19'71 (P. Carrington ed. 1971) (AALS 1971 Annual Meeting Proceedings, Part One. 
Section 11) (Carrington report). 
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t.aken seriously.12 
Despite the failures of the past, Messrs. Gee and Jackson 
plunged ahead. What might have seemed a further handi- 
cap-limited experience in legal education-they managed to 
turn into the virtue of providing a fresh and nonestablishment 
view of legal education. 
The special attraction of the volume to me is that the scope 
of the undertaking is both so ambitious and so limited. Let me 
explain the apparent paradox. On the side of ambition they as- 
pire to no less than a comprehensive review of contemporary 
American legal education, including such varied aspects as these: 
* A brief but useful history of legal education in the United 
States. 
* A review of English legal education in which they demon- 
strate (as we all should have known) its inferiority in comparison 
with American legal education (even though the British system 
has produced some dazzling masters of oral advocacy). 
* A summary of the various proposals for change which, as 
previously mentioned, came to little. 
* A survey of several law school programs (Antioch, North- 
eastern, and Southwestern) that differ from the mainstream. 
* A guide to the new techniques and technologies from the 
world of computers and programmed teaching. 
* An especially useful comparison of legal education and 
education for the related professions of business, accounting; and 
medicine. 
* A summary of current thinking about bar examinations 
(including the Multistate Bar Examination). 
* A comprehensible s ta tement  of the  issues in t h e  
competent-advocate controversy sparked by Chief Justice 
Burger. 
* A careful look at  clinical training, the only innovation that 
has really taken hold in American legal education. 
The authors make no claim to complete exposition of every 
subject discussed, and some of the material, particularly the his- 
tory and the British comparison, is admittedly derivative, al- 
though the sources are clearly identified for those who wish more 
detail. The virtue of this volume is that for the first time it is all 
12. The American Bar Foundation has in progress a major study of legal education. 
The original statement of the study, a prospectus as it were, is excellent. Boyer & Cram- 
ton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research and Reform, 59 CORNELL L.REV. 
221 (1974). But nothing further has surfaced to date. 
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put together in one place. Although the treatment of each subject 
is relatively brief, i t  is surprisingly complete-certainly full 
enough to permit a more comprehensive overall view of American 
legal education than is available anywhere else in a single vol- 
ume.13 
The study is also limited in its scope. The authors do not 
write as reformers, and they have no explicit recommendations 
for change. Rather, in their words, the effort is 
to extrapolate certain trends and tendencies, make some tenta- 
tive inferences, and present some projections (or speculations) 
about the future of American legal education. We offer sugges- 
tions and admonitions, not so much about the structure, con- 
tent, or process of legal education as about the factors that are 
likely to affect efforts either to preserve the status quo or to 
produce educational change.14 
Despite this clear warning that the authors intend to pursue 
a neutral cobrse, passing no judgments except as to whether 
change (of an unspecified character) might or might not occur, I 
was at  first disappointed in the final section which did just this 
and no more. On rereading, I think I was wrong. The important 
contribution Gee and Jackson have made in presenting a 
straightforward description of the forces that shape American 
legal education today might have been blunted if they were seen 
as advocates of particular change. By remaining neutrali5 the 
authors can allow their work to stand as the excellent description 
that I believe it to be of the forces that shape legal education 
today and are likely to reshape it tomorrow. 
If there is in the volume any element of seeming blandness 
in its failure to assert strong positions, that can be corrected in 
what I hope will be their next book on how to deal with the 
problems of legal education in the context of the problems of 
society a t  large. 
13. Understandably, some matters receive little or no attention. I recall, for example, 
no substantial discussion of law libraries, university relations, financing of legal educa- 
tion, or faculty-student governance issues. Those are important matters, but not central 
to the profile of legal education which is uniquely available in the Gee-Jackson study. 
14. Gee & .Jackson. wpm note 6, at 703. 
15. Even that is not fully accurate. In Section VII the authors express a preference, 
which they state is shared by students, for training that prepares the graduate to be a 
"professional"-perhaps a blend of the best in the "scholar" and the "technician." Proba- 
bly every law school would claim a similar objective. 
